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the coal in place, usually to be ascertained by finding its value at
the pit-mouth or loading tipple, and deducting therefrom the expense of mining and carrying it to the pit-mouth or tipple." The
decision follows the Spruce River Case, and is in accord with a
leading Missouri case. Austin v. Huntsville (oal & Mining (o.,
72 Mo. 535. But it should be noted that the value at the pit-mouth,
less the cost of getting it there, does not necessarily represent the
value of the coal in place, but usually is greater; and that to give
the plaintiff the pit-mouth price in damages is to compensate him
for more than he has been injured, and to deprive the innocent
trespasser of the profits of his labor expended in good faith.
--. D. H.

EQUITY--JURISDICTION-ATTACHMENT

IN ACTIONS

EX DELICTO.

-A entered into a contract with B whereby A was to obtain coal
lands and B was to sell them, the profits to be divided between
them. B sold the lands, but failed to account for the profits. B
prepared to remove from the state all the profits derived from the
sales and A brought a bill in equity praying that B be required
to make a full discovery of said sales and that an accounting be
had, and pursuant to section 1 of chapter 106 of the Code a process of garnishment was issued against the persons with whom the
said funds had been deposited by B. The court held, by way of
dictum, that under this section courts of equity have no jurisdiction as to causes of action ex delicto. Snyder v. Breitinggr et al.,
130 S. E. 96, (W. Va. 1925).
The construction of this section as expressed in the above dictum
seems now to be the well settled rule in this state. Swarthmore
Lun/ber Co. v. Parks, 72 W. Va. 625, 79 S. E. 723; Mabie v. Moore,
75 W. Va. 761, 84 S. E. 788. But it will be noted that an earlier
case did not so construe this section. In the case of McKinsey v.
Squires, 32 W. Va. 41, 9 S. E. 55, it was contended that as the
cause of action alleged in the bill was for unliquidated damages for
a personal injury, a court of equity had no jurisdiction. The court
said: "It is unquestionably true that this statute (referring to
the above section) must be construed strictly, but its language is
so direct and positive that it does not admit of construction. It
authorizes a suit by attachment in equity to recover damages for
any wrong." Judge Poffenbarger in Swarthmore Lumber Corn-
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panry v. Parks, supra, in discussing the last paragraph of the section, authorizing an attachment in a court of equity for a debt or
claim, legal or equitable, whether the same be due or not, upon any
of the grounds stated, said: "In this clause, the words "debt or
claim" do not include damages for a wrong. By the first paragraph of the section an attachment is given in actions to recover
such damages, but the last paragraph, conferring special equity
jurisdiction, carefully omits claims arising out of tort. The first
paragraph enumerates three classes of actions, those for claims or
debts arising out of contracts and damages for wrongs. But two
of these are enumerated in the last paragraph. The omission clearly signifies intent not to allow an attachment in equity for causes
of action ex deicto." The question probably turns on the proper
definition to be given to the word "claim." Woulcl it not be possi•ble to argue that it was the legislative intent to have the word
"debt" refer to causes of action ex contractu and the word "claim"
refer to causes of action ex delicto? What is a claim? Construing
a statute allowing an attachment in actions at law upon a demand,
whether liquidated or not, arising upon a contract or a judgment,
or a decree requiring plaintiff to specify the amount of his
"claim", and the grounds therefor, the coutrt in Saddlesvene v.
Arms, 32 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 280, said that the word "claim" is the
equivalent of a debt or demand arising out of the express or implied terms of a contract. Stimson's Law Dictionary defines the
word "claim" as a demand of some matter as of right made by one
person upon another, to do or forbear to do some act or thing as
a matter of duty. Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines the word
"claim" as a challenge of the ownership of a thing which is wrofigfully withheld from the possession of the claimant. In a popular
sense, claim is a right to claim; a just title to something in the possession or at the disposal of another. The assertion of a liability
to the party making it to do some service or to pay a sum of money.
Conceding that there may be some room for argument that the
word "claim" as used in the last paragraph of the section in question should be construed to include damages for a wrong, and that,
as has been urged, the court established the rule laid down in
Mabie v. Moore, and mentioned with approval in the principal case,
for its convenience, hoping to restrict general equity jurisdiction,
did not the court in doing so wisely construe the statute? As Judge
Lynch said, in Mabie v. Moore, if the statute provides for an attachment in a suit in equity for the recovery of damages for any
wrong the inevitable, logical conclusion to be drawn from such a
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construction of the statute would be to confer on courts of equity
jurisdiction to entertain suits for the recovery of damages for
assault and battery, adultery, seduction, or any other wrong to
the person or property of another, solely by virtue of an attachment sued out on any of the grounds mentioned in the statute.
Surely, such was not the legislative intent.

-E.H.Y.

EVIDENCE-IMPEACHING CREDIBUATY 3Y PREVIOUS CONVICTION-

While D, on trial for forgery, was being cross-examined as a witness on his own behalf, he was asked if he had not previously been
convicted for breaking jail, while he was being confined for complicity in breaking into a drugstore. It was moved to strike out
the question and answer, but the trial court refused to do so, on
the ground that it was competent evidence as affecting the credibility of the witness. Held, that this was error. State v. Webb,
128 S. E. 97 (W. Va. 1925).
In its opinion the Supreme Court of Appeals draws a distinction between the accused as a witness and other witnesses for the
defense. It has been stated that upon the examination of a witness
called to impeach the credibility of another witness,-in this case,
for the state,-questions involving general character other than
those directly concerning the witness' veracity, are not permitted.
Uhl v. Commonwealth, 6 Gratt. 706. It is difficult to see why this
rule should not apply to all witnesses. The reason for following
the rule in the principal case is thus stated by Lively, J., "Many
persons have been convicted of crimes and misdemeanors engendered by heat of passion and inconsiderate action, infirmities in
human nature which are more or less prevalent in all. We can
see no reason why such convictions would affect the credibility
or veracity of such a person who is being tried for a subsequent
and wholly unconnected offense." It would seem that this reasoning should apply with equal force to any witness. Yet the court,
in this same case, discusses and sustains the distinction in State v.
Hill, 52 W. Va. 296, in which it is laid down that a witness for the
defense,--other than the accused,-may be asked, in order to discredit him, if he has been confined in the penitentiary. A defendant, testifying in his own behalf, is protected on cross-examination
by the same rules, regarding the admissibility of evidence as are
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